and contemporary issues as a part of his campaign to educate people about Islam. This exposure made him a prominent media personality. xi Since 2006 has been a member of the Council of Islamic Ideology, government of Pakistan. Although Ghāmidī's thought has been significantly influenced by his predecessors Farahī and Islahī xii but many of his contributions to the Islamic thought are original. This is, for example, evident in his major work Mizan in which he has explained the foundational principles of understanding Islam. These principles are based on the understanding that the specific nature of the Qurʾān and ḥadīth is such that it requires systematic interpretational models in order for their teachings to be understood correctly.
In Mizan it is evident that Ghāmidī follows and further elaborates on Islahī's views, especially on his conceptual, epistemological and methodological delineation between Sunna and ḥadīth bodies of knowledge. Like Islahī, Ghāmidī equates the concept of Sunna with that of millet Ibrahim by which he refers to the religious traditions of the faith of Prophet Abraham (who in the Qurʿān xiii is described as a ḥanīf a person who follows true monotheism) which Prophet
Muḥammad revived, reformed and added on. He argues that these religious practices have reached us through in actu (bodily perpetuations of numerous individuals) based sources of knowledge and not written or oral based such as the ḥadīth. xiv Therefore, the Sunna's epistemological value is same as that of the Qurʾān and much higher than that of ḥadīth few of which, if any, Ghāmidī considers to have such epistemological value. xv This concept of Sunna is understood as being based on perpetuation of religious practices only through ijmāʿ of Prophet's Companions and Successors by means of what he refers to as " ʾamali tawātur" . This concept of ʾamali tawātur is in many ways, from an epistemological vantage-point, similar to the Mālikī concept of ʾamal based Sunna discussed above.
Importantly, Ghāmidī has identified the precise content and nature of sunan, the individual components of Sunna, which form the complete content of religion. He categorizes them into:
i. Worship Rituals (i. the ṣalāt; zakāt and ṣadaqat of 'Id al-Fiṭr; sawm and I'tiqāf; Ḥajj and ʾUmra; Animal Sacrifice at end of Ḥajj);
ii. Social Sphere (Marriage and Divorce and their relevant details; abstention from coitus during the menstrual and the puerperal period);
iii. Dietary Sphere (Prohibition of pork, blood, meat of dead animals and animals slaughtered in the name of someone other than Allah; Slaughtering in the prescribed manner of tadkhiya by pronouncing Allah's name);
iv. Customs and Etiquette ( Remembering Allah's name before eating or drinking and using the right hand for eating and drinking; Greeting one another with as-Salāmu ʾalaikum (peace be to you) and responding with Wa ʾalaikum as-salām (and peace be to you); Saying al-ḥamdulillah (praise be to Allah) after sneezing and responding to it by saying yarḥamukallah (may Allah have mercy on you); keeping the moustaches trimmed;
shaving pubic hair; removing the hairs under the armpits; paring fingernails; circumcising the male offspring; cleaning the nose, the mouth and the teeth; cleaning the body after excretion and urination; bathing after the menstrual and the puerperal periods; bathing the dead before burial; enshrouding a dead body and preparing it for burial; burying the dead; 'Id al-Fiṭr and 'Id al-Adha. xvi Corollary to his efforts in specifying the content of Sunna, Ghāmidī has developed several methodological criteria for determining scope and nature of Sunna too. These include the following:
i. Sunna pertains only to things that are religious in nature and to practical affairs of life;
ii. In addition to following the principles of delineating the contents, the nature and the scope of Sunna, Ghāmidī has elaborated on the principles in understanding ḥadīth. He defines ḥadīth as "are narratives which record the words, deeds and tacit approvals of the Prophet Muḥammad (s.)." He argues that they are mostly akhbar-i aḥad (isolated reports) and do not add to the contents of religion which is in its entirety found in the Qurʾān and Sunna. Ghāmidī, readily acknowledges that ḥadīth literature is "the largest and most important source which records the biography, history and the exemplary life of the Prophet Muḥammad as well as his invaluable explanations of various issues of religion". The first criteria that pertains to the examination of the chain ( isnād) of ḥadīth involves examination of any hidden flaws in the chain of narration of a ḥadīth (ʾilāl), the probity of the narrators (ʾadl), their grasp and memory (ḍabṭ) and their contemporaneousness (ittisāl) . In relation to the establishing the authenticity of the text of the ḥadīth Ghāmidī argues that nothing in the text should be against the Qurʾān and Sunna and the established facts derived from "knowledge and reason". Another criterion pertains to the language of the ḥadīth which, like that of the Qurʾān, is high literary Arabic. In this context Ghāmidī argues that only after an extensive period of learning and training those "conversant with the delicacies of the Arabic language and its various styles and constructions" are able to detect problems with the language in a ḥadīth on the basis of which that particular ḥadīth can be rejected. Another criteria that can be employed in understanding ḥadīth pertains to Ghāmidī's argument of the Qurʾān self-description of being mizān (the "Scale of Truth") and furqān (the "Distinguisher" between truth and falsehood). Because of this nature of the Qurʾān it is like "a guardian of every religious concept and it has been revealed as a barometer to judge between what is right and what is wrong". Therefore, the Qurʾān is not dependent on the ḥadīth for its explanation including for the purposes of its specification. On the contrary, the ḥadīth need to be interpreted in the light of the Qurʾān and cannot change or modify the Qurʾān in any way. In Ghāmidī's thought the scope of ḥadīth is solely confined to explaining and elucidating religion or in delineating the exemplar of the Prophet. Ghāmidī also tells us that a correct understanding of ḥadīth also entails discerning the question who its original addressees, hence it must be understood with reference to the instance and occasion of the topic it records.
xix Another criterion Ghāmidī for having a correct understanding of ḥadīth is the idea that all the variant texts of a ḥadīth must be studied before making any judgment regarding its soundness.
xx Finally, since revelation and reason can never exist in a contradictory relationship, any ḥadīth, if found to be contrary to reason, is to be rejected.
xxi Following Islahī, and based on the above outlined considerations , Ghāmidī considers that ḥadīth can be accepted as sources of legal authority only if the basis for such a ḥadīth exists in the Qurʾān ,Sunna or the established principles of human nature and intellect.
xxii To sum up Ghāmidī has a developed a very specific and systematic theory pertaining to the definition of Sunna that is both epistemologically and methodologically independent of ḥadīth. He considers Sunna as an independent source of legal authority in relation to religious practices only. The ḥadīth are not an independent source of legal authority in Islam and their content can be accepted only if it is in accordance with several criteria discussed above. made a clear conceptual distinction between Sunna and ḥadīth bodies of knowledge. He conceptualizes Sunna in form of a general normative moral law and an ethico-religious behavioral system giving rise to a normative practice that cannot textually fixed. Rahman also conceptualizes Sunna as a concept that allows for interpretation and adaptation. This is so, argues Rahman, because Sunna, as a concept, was inclusive of Prophet's own raʿy and qiyās as well as those of the Companions which gave rise to ijmāʿ.
2.2.Fazrul Rahman
xxvii xxv As such, Rahman argues that Sunna, as a normative ethico-religious behavioral system, was not large in quantity and was not meant to be something specific because "no two cases in practices are identical in their moral, psychological or material settings." xxvi Another argument Rahman mentions in favor of the idea that the "original" concept of Sunna is not what is contained in the medieval ḥadīth-fiqhi literature is that Prophet Muḥammad was first and foremost a moral reformer and that he only on very rare occasions resorted to "general legislation as a means of furthering the Islamic cause." Therefore, Rahman continues, the Prophet's legislative activity was far from being that of a pan-legist but very much situation-based and ad hoc as mirrored and confirmed by the content of Qurʾān itself. Hence, he argues, Prophet's legal actions could not be 'strictly' and 'literally' taken as normative. Furthermore, Rahman argues that Sunna historically underwent changes from being a dynamic concept first associated with general ethico-behavior norms of the Prophet overtime becoming co-extensive and existing in a dialectic relationship with the concept of ijmāʿ of the Muslim community that was inclusive of ijtihād. Rahman continues that with the massive increase in circulation and writing down of ḥadīth and the onset of the process of what we above described as ḥadīthification of Sunna, however, the organic link between Sunna-ijtihād and ijmāʿ became undone and Sunna was largely conflated with the concept of a saḥih ḥadīth as per early classical ulūm ul-ḥadīth. xxviii Rahman, unlike Ghāmidī, does not attempt to clearly delineate the contents of the concept of Sunna.
Rahman clearly recognizes the importance of ḥadīth for Muslims and the study of history by provocatively and rhetorically asking "if all of ḥadīth is given up what remains but a yawning chasm between us and the Prophet"? xxxii xxxiii xxxiv xxix He also describes the methods of whose who "in the name of progressivism wish to brush aside the ḥadīth and the Prophetic Sunna" as worse than Nero's methods of rebuilding Rome. xxx Equipped with his Sunna-ijmāʿ -ijtihād theory, Rahman considers that the ḥadīth are suggestive of ''the sum total of aphorisms put out by the Muslims themselves, ostensibly about the Prophet, although not without an ultimate historical touch with the Prophet.'' xxxi He asserts further that ḥadīth represent the "interpreted spirit of the prophetic teaching" and a total fixation of formerly dynamic living Sunna that crystallized as a result of ijtihād-ijmāʿ process.
Having formulated these views of the nature and the scope of the concepts of Sunna and ḥadīth, Rahman argued that in all cases in which the Qurʾān conflicts with the ḥadīth, the Qurʾān had to be privileged over the ḥadīth categorically, since the Qurʾān, unlike the ḥadīth, is the direct and preeminent source of God's guidance.
In summary, Rahman has developed a very systematic theory of the inter-relationship between ḥadīth and Sunna bodies of knowledge as well as a precise definition of Sunna whose normativeness as source of legal authority he readily recognized. However, he strongly departs from the ḥadīth-based concept of Sunna and considers ḥadīth ,in principle, not as the container for content of the concept of Sunna. Thereby he denies their normative value as independent source of legal authority restricting greatly their role in Qurʾānic interpretation to that of important sources of early Muslim opinions about the Qurʾān and the Prophet and history of early Muslim thought.
Muḥammad Shahrūr
Muḥammad Shahrūr (b.1938), is one of the "most interesting and innovative thinkers in the contemporary Arab-Muslim world". xxxvi xxxv The success of his first book on Islam, Al-kitāb wa'l Qurʾān: qiraʾa muʾasira (The Book and the Qurʾān: A contemporary reading (1990)) , which has sold vast number of copies, has been described as an extraordinary book that "challenges a millennium of Islamic tradition". It propelled Shahrūr into being one of the most controversial and talked about figures among intellectuals, students, and scholars of the entire Middle East during the 1990s. The controversy around The Book and the Qurʾān started immediately after its first release in Syria in 1990 and has lasted over a decade with many books and articles written on it. There were even views that Shahrūr's book was part of a Zionist organization plot to produce a new commentary of the Qurʾān by using an Arab writer's name. Islamic jurists' excessive fixation on the life of Muḥammad (s) has led to the unfortunate result that the Sunna of the Prophet (s) not only became theoretically the second most authoritative source of Islamic law but practically also very often the primary source of legislation. When issuing their fatwas-in particular on legal issues with far reaching social and political implications-Islamic jurists very often ignored the rules of the Book or had them replaced by the Sunna, which over time became their ultimate-and often only-point of reference. By focusing on the Sunna of the Prophet (s) as a major source of Islamic legislation, our honourable scholars clearly over stepped the mark when they began to treat it as the principal and most authoritative source of truth, equal if not superior to the word of God in the Book. Their theologically most detestable step was to regard the Book as incomplete and in need of the elaborations and specifications of the Sunna, implying that a divine text needs to be completed and confirmed by a human source-which is a truly blasphemous thought! xlvii Shahrūr laments that this ḥadīth-based Sunna has resulted in "no room for innovative thinking, reform, or renewal in Islamic law." xlviii To counter the ḥadīth-based approach to Sunna, Shahrūr develops an innovative (but not unprecedented) discussion of the concept of Sunna. Shahrūr, makes a distinction between the prophetic (nubuwwa) and messenger (risāla) aspects of Muḥammad's divine mission. In this context, he argues that the former deals with the universalist dimension of the Divine message as embodied in the Al-Kitāb xlix which he restricts to eschatological and purely theological issues and which are ambiguous and transcend this earthly reality. The latter is concerned solely with definite, unambiguous and objective reality which is subject to human faculties and senses. He goes on to opine that only the Qurʾān (in contradistinction to ḥadīth and Sunna) is the sole source of both nubuwwa and risāla because only the Qurʾān possess the ontological quality of 'being in and for itself'. The Sunna, as shall be elaborated on more below, on the other hand, is defined by Shahrūr as Prophet's own humanbound, non-absolute ijtihād/interpretation/understanding of the Al-Kitāb. i.) the idea that Prophet's decisions were conditioned by his historical context;
ii.) his ijtihād in restricting the allowed did not need divine revelation;
iii.) his restrictions of the 'unrestricted permissions' (ḥalal muṭlaq) were subject to constant corrections as a result in change in circumstances in his own life; In this category Shahrūr includes Muḥammad's prohibition of music, dance, singing, the visual arts, visiting the graves which "enjoy neither absolute validity nor eternal authority." This is so because these prohibitions and their rationale were organically linked to the context of the prevailing idolatry of Arabian society of the time.
Apart from his novel insights into the concept of Sunna, Shahrūr also innovatively classifies ḥadīth into two categories, namely, words of wisdom and prophetic statements. The former "contain moral sayings that are universally understood and shared by all people". They are "formulated from the pool of human experiences and hence come from within human beings. They may be perceived by revelation but revelation is not necessary in order to speak words of wisdom but no religious or civil law should be based on words of wisdom." These statements are outside of the sphere of belief (al-ʾ imān) and because the Prophet had no special knowledge about the unseen world, it would be improper for believers to take these statements as the truth.
The statements about legal injunctions (ḥadīth al-aḥkām) which "comprise every legal injunction and every piece of legislation that Prophet Muḥammad issued are another group of statements identified by Shahrūr. They are in strict compliance with the verses of the Book and between the limits that Allah has set. Basing himself on the conceptualization of Sunna as outlined above, Shahrūr argues that these statements were contingent on the social and political problems that the Prophet faced in ancient Arabia. As such these statements are not binding upon the subsequent generations of Muslims "because they merely reflect his activities as a mujtāhid who responded to the needs of his time and who applied rulings that the objective conditions of his society made necessary." Therefore, even if today's believers deviate from the letter of the prophetic ijtihād this does not undermine ithe potential validity of their ijtihād and does not diminish their 'love for the Prophet Muḥammad'. The fourth category Shahrūr terms 'Sacred Statements' which in the classical Islamic tradition pertains to the aḥadīth al-quḍsiyya about the unseen world which were believed to be inspired by divine revelation. Shahrūr dismisses the claim that they are sacred or divine on the basis of the same reasoning he used in relation to the second category, the above mentioned aḥadīth al-akhbar bi l-ghayb. The final category identified by Shahrūr refers to "Personal Statements" which he names aḥadīth al-hayāt al-insanī. These pertain to the sayings about Muḥammad's personal life, his eating and sleeping habits, his favorite pastimes, his way of dressing, speaking, travelling, walking, running, hunting, and so on. They also include his kindness, good-naturedness, tolerance, courage, and his feelings about justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, hardship and welfare, and so forth." Shahrūr forms the view that these cannot in any way be considered normative as they belong solely personal matters.
lxii So for Shahrūr, ḥadīth and Sunna, as he defines them, are clearly not independent or supplementary sources of legal authority in Islam. Their role in Qurʾānic interpretation is nonbinding and minimal.
Ghulām Parwez
Ghulām Parwez (d. 1985 ) was a Pakistani scholar based in Lahore and a founder of the Tolu-eIslam movement. The words "Tolu-e-Islam" meaning "dawn" or "resurgence" of Islam, were taken from the title of a poem by the sub-continent's great Muslim philosopher and poet Allama Iqbal (d. 1938) . According to its website the aims and objectives of Tolu-e-Islam are:
to remove all non-Qurʾānic ideologies, beliefs, and practices prevalent in present-day Islam, and replace them with Qurʾānic concepts based upon reason and rationale. Tolu-e-Islam's literature is essentially directed towards individuals who are in search of truth so that they can overcome the forces of secularism and be able to establish a pure Qurʾānic society, wherever they may be. In 1938, under the instructions of Ali Jinnah (d. 1948) , the founder of modern day Pakistan, Parwez started publishing monthly Tolu-e-Islam whose primary purpose was to propagate the idea that, according to the Qurʾān, ideology and not geographical boundary, was the basis for the formation of nation, and that a politically independent state was a pre-requisite for living an that is purely Qurʾānic, based on truth (quoting Qurʾān 35:31) and that only the Qurʾān has been conveyed and preserved to the humankind in a complete and authentic form. Parwez adds that the same does not hold true for ḥadīth as neither Allah nor the Prophet put mechanisms in place to ensure the same for the ḥadīth. He rebuts the views of traditionalist scholars who espouse the view that ḥadīth/Sunna constitute un-recited revelation (waḥy ghayr al-maṭlū) discussed above. Parwez also vehemently rejects the classical view that the Qurʾān is more in need of Sunna/ḥadīth than vice versa including the idea that that Sunna/ḥadīth can abrogate or negate the Qurʾān. Parwez also highlights that even if one subscribes to the classical argument of the Prophet serving as the Qurʾān's best explicator, the ḥadīth literature on the subject is not even remotely comprehensive enough to perform this function. An additional argument for the Qurʾān's self -sufficiency is made on the basis of referring to conflicting definitions of the concept of Sunna that exist among traditional minded Muslim scholars which, in his view, can only give rise to division and sectarianism among Muslims. He maintains that the correct understanding of the concept of 'following the Prophet' is by following the Qurʾān's system (al-dīn) only. In this context he states:
To follow God means to follow His law revealed in the Book". The preservation of which He took upon His Ownself. By virtue of this, the Messenger became capable of delivering it in concrete book form to the whole of Muslim umma. In the same vein, 'to follow the Messenger' will not mean that a person or group makes his own clichés of Messenger's teachings and starts to follow them. It is absolutely necessary, that in order to follow, we must have an objective standard. By this we can conclude, God did not put any seal of His authority nor did the Messenger deliver it to his disciples in any concrete form with his approval; that it was neither in God's program nor the aim of the Messenger, to preserve the ḥadīth.
Parwez uses the classical argument that ḥadīth are not the verbatim reproductions of the prophetic sayings but merely interpretations as another argument against them being included as part of al-dīn. He adds that the classical efforts which have attempted to 'rationalize' and 'authenticate' ḥadīth were insufficient as they suffer from inherent epistemological and methodological weaknesses and that there is no "divine proof" for them to be accepted as normative. The only normative ḥadīth is the Qurʾān. He rejects the classical theory according to which there is the "utmost need for aḥadīth" because without them, we cannot grasp the correct interpretation of the Qurʾān. Instead, not unlike Shahrūr, he argues for Qurʾān by Qurʾān (known classically as taʾwil al Qurʾān bi -l Qurʾān) interpretation only and demonstrates how certain interpretations of Qurʾānic passages are contradicted by ḥadīth.
lxix Parwez forms the view that "the correct stature of ḥadīth happens to be as history of al-dīn. It can prove beneficial to history, but to present it forward to rationalize al-dīn will carry little meanings". Parwez also argues that the most damaging aspect of placing ḥadīth next to al-dīn, was that it caused Qurʾān, "that is full of life, to go into eclipse." lxx Importantly, Parwez does not make a systematic distinction between Sunna and ḥadīth as do other scholars discussed in this article.
In summary, Parwez upholds the view that ḥadīth and Sunna, as he defines them, do not constitute sources of legal authority in Islam (or what he calls al-dīn) . He forms the view that the Qurʾān is fully self-sufficient in terms of its own interpretation and that ḥadīth and Sunna have in many instances eclipsed and distorted the actual Qurʾānic teachings, including those which have legal import.
3.Conclusion
Contemporary Muslim scholars whom we have examined in this article have contributed many important methodological and hermeneutical insights into the question that, as we saw in all of the previous chapters, has a long genealogy in Muslim thought, namely the status of Sunna and ḥadīth bodies of knowledge as source of legal authority and tools in Qurʾānic interpretation. Despite coming from, at times, very different educational and socio-cultural and backgrounds all of them share the idea that the mainstream classical-based scholarships' position on the role and the status of Sunna and ḥadīth as sources of legal authority vis-à-vis the Qurʾān needed to
